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1. Internet art and social criticism
A great deal of Internet art, from its inception in the mid-90s, has actively sought 
to establish, as its focal point, this new medium’s inherent potential for social and 
political transformation. Those artists and collectives at the forefront of this emerging 
trend for digital creation took on the challenge of thinking about the Internet 
critically, by analysing the politics of its operations and contemplating the ways in 
which communication technologies might be able to evade their own colonisation 
by economic interests.
In their revisiting of the aims set out, decades prior, by those initiatives linked 
to the more politicised conceptual art, many proponents of Internet art hoped to 
defend the role of artistic creation beyond a reflection on the meanings that may have 
become damaged, lost or improbable in the consumer society. They carried out an 
intense thematisation of the processes of inclusion of the subject within the network 
culture and economy, and of how the subject adapts to it, as well as the possibilities 
offered by the Internet for critique and social transformation.
More specifically, based on the arguments that called for a new dissolution of 
what we understand as “artistic practices” in the ever-expanding sphere of activities 
within digital political activism, we might even claim that there has been no such 
thing as Internet art, but rather an “artistic” use of it, just as there was no situationist 
painting or music per se, but rather “a situationist use of these media”3.
2. Online activism as “performance art” on the Internet?
Most of the strategies used in early digital activism came from taking certain activist 
tactics, i.e. forms of protest on the streets4, and transferring them to the world of the 
Internet. 
The clearest example of this is the so-called “virtual sit-in”, an action in which a 
large group of people come together to attack a particular targeted website, causing 
it to crash and leaving it inoperative for a certain amount of time. To achieve this, the 
many thousands of participants must continuously reload the site in question, on their 
own computers, often through various applications tailor-made for this purpose. If the 
number of simultaneous participants is large enough, the server becomes saturated, 
and access to the website is blocked. In this type of action, the computer screen was 
deemed a possible space for the joint act of protest. In any case, the dissemination of 
the news that preceded and followed these types of actions, with the aim of reaching 
the largest number of people possible, was undoubtedly more relevant than the direct 
effects, always temporary and, in any case, reversible, of the action itself.
There are many examples of this kind of peaceful online protest, or “netstrike”. 
Since 1995, when one of the first and most well-known netstrikes took place (namely 
the one launched by the Strano Network on 21st December of that year, in protest of 
France’s nuclear experiments in Mururoa, and which managed to slow down some 
3 Debord, G. «Theory of the Dérive and Definitions», in Gieseking J. J. & Mangold, W. (eds.), The people, Place, 
and Space Reader, New York, Routledge, 2014, p. 68.
4 See Critical Art Ensemble, The Electronic Disturbance (1993) [http://www.critical-art.net/books/ted/] and 
Electronic Civil Disobedience and Other Unpopular ideas (1996) [http: //www.critical-art.net/books/ecd/].
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of the French government’s websites), dozens of them have been carried out with a 
range of different objectives.
One of the most widely-discussed virtual sit-ins was SWARM, coordinated in 
1998 by the “artivist” group Electronic Disturbance Theater. They aimed to block, 
temporarily, via a Java applet called Floodnet, various institutional websites, such 
as those of The Pentagon, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and the website of the 
Mexican presidency (being, as they were, supportive of the Zapatista cause). In this 
case, when prompted, their application provided the user with messages such as 
“human_rights not found on this server”.
In the purely political sense, these types of online actions would clearly be 
meaningless without mass participation (in SWARM, for example, around 75,000 
protesters took part). For members of the Critical Art Ensemble, such widespread 
support was key: something that might otherwise have been interpreted as a 
straightforward act of computer vandalism was transformed into a model exercise 
in solidarity, all in the name of political denunciation and the demand for justice. 
The result was a form of activism that only ever sought to speak from the position 
of the victim – a protest which aimed, above all, to amplify the defiant voices of the 
multitude. 
In terms of the issues raised in this section, it is highly revealing that Carmin 
Karasic, co-creator of Floodnet with Brett Stalbaum, insisted that “this isn’t 
cyberterrorism - it’s more like conceptual art”5. Similarly, other leading proponents 
of cyber-activism, such as Ricardo Dominguez, have stated that these cyber-protests 
are “performance art” on the Internet. Ascribing them to the concept of “art” (note 
the clear importance of the fact that, in order to channel this connection, the central 
theme of the 1998 Ars Electronica festival was “Infowar”) would allow for the 
artistic activity to be identified with a model of collaborative and critical practice, 
as a producer of collective action and active resistance within the technoculture. 
This practice entailed disrupting a given information system (an institutional or 
governmental page), in order to make “symbolic” statements to reflect the people’s 
indignation. This artistic action would therefore have a somewhat traditional purpose, 
that is to “represent” (in the literal sense of “making present”) a shared mood: in 
many cases, the anger and dissatisfaction of tens of thousands of people.
In March 2010, when Electronic Disturbance Theater, in collaboration with bang.
lab, proposed a “virtual sit-in” at the website of the Office of the President of the 
University of California, in protest against budget cuts, hikes in tuition fees, and 
what they interpreted as the privatisation of the University, academic authorities 
took immediate measures to try and criminalise this action. In response, at some of 
the protests that took place at the University of California campus in San Diego in 
support of Ricardo Domínguez, he was heard declaring that “online protest is not a 
crime. Online protest is art”6.
However, the absolute consolidation of art and political action, as suggested by 
projects like this, risks being interpreted as a mere strategy for survival in itself. 
That is, the concept “art”, when applied to this form of protest, would only serve, in 
5 Quoted by Harmon, A., «“Hacktivists” of All Persuasions Take Their Struggle to the Web», The New York 
Times (31st October 1998) [https://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/31/world/hacktivists-of-all-persuasions-take-
their-struggle-to-the-web.html].
6 See the video entitled «Ricardo Dominguez, UCSD Library Walk» (April 8th, 2010) on YouTube [https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=5Yr2RH_dNEY].
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reality, to act as a decoy for the criminal implications that these acts could imply. In 
fact, some of Domínguez’s own statements seem to reinforce this hypothesis: “the 
reason they can’t stop us is that we always frame all these gestures within the poetic 
frame”7.
But perhaps the biggest hurdle to considering this type of action as artistic practice 
is the fact that the concept of “art” barely seems compatible with what is effectively 
the forced silencing (widely acknowledged as a manifest form of violence) of some 
of the parties involved in the “situation” generated. This same criticism was also 
shared by many who had evaluated such actions strictly in terms of their political 
aspects. In fact, actions like this have encountered strong opposition in many currents 
of digital activism, precisely because of the confrontational nature of the blockade, 
which, in some way, threatens the free expression of the opponent. Although, on the 
one hand, we might consider that blocking or restricting access to certain websites 
could be seen as a way of retaliating against governmental policies of restricting 
communication, these blockades have been interpreted, by many sectors of digital 
activism, as actions that go against the basic principles of the anti-globalisation 
movements, characterised by their reverence for absolute freedom of expression. 
As such, it should not be overlooked that many of these interventions have been 
strongly criticised for not consulting the opinion of the social groups they intend to 
help, and for representing yet another form of political interventionism of the most 
technologically advanced countries over the less developed ones. A mistaken act 
of paternalism, as the Ame la Paz association said of the SWARM action, which 
evoked long-standing colonial attitudes, by ignoring the capabilities and strategies 
developed by the Mexican activist groups themselves. These groups called for the 
end of interventions of this kind, stating that any external help would be better in 
the form of training, in helping develop their websites, translating their content into 
other languages, protecting their mailing lists, and preventing the collection and 
diversion of their emails, as well as offering advice on the surveillance procedures 
and systems through which governments monitor the movements and activities of 
activist groups on the Internet.
Another web-based adaptation of street protest strategies is that of virtual protests. 
As with virtual sit-ins, many of these “cyber-demonstrations” were also proposed 
and considered by many to be “artistic” practices in themselves. This is the case, 
for example, of MayDay Net Parade8 (2004), a project by Molleindustria, and a 
critique of the precarious labour market in the European Union. The protest featured 
a digital representation of European May Day 2004, in the form of an online protest 
of digital avatars, in which 17,000 people participated. Another example would be 
Tweet4Action.com (2011) by Les Liens Invisibles, an ironic initiative defined as the 
ultimate tool for “sofa activism”9 and only comprehensible in the context of the 
“Twitter Revolution” at the end of the 2000s.
A greater level of technical sophistication, beyond that needed for virtual sit-
ins, is required for the creation of botnets. This strategy entails the “kidnapping”, 
7 Quoted by Ramey, C., «Artivists and Mobile Phones: The Transborder Immigrant Project», MobileActive.
org, (November 17th, 2007). [http://www.thing.net/~rdom/ucsd/tenure/Artivists%20and%20Mobile%20
Phones_%20The%20Transborder%20Immigrant%20Project%20%7C%20MobileActive.org.pdf].
8 [http://www.euromayday.org/netparade/]
9 As described in the presentation of the work on the Turbulence.org platform [http://turbulence.org/archives/11.
html].
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by whoever is coordinating the protest action, of hundreds or even thousands of 
computers, which are then used to participate (without, of course, the consent of 
their owners or users) in an attack on a designated website, with a view to blocking 
it – the targeted site is hit again and again, in what has been called a “distributed 
denial-of-service” (DDOS). One of the best-known cyberattacks of this kind was the 
one launched by several of the world’s governments against the website Wikileaks, 
in December 2010, in an attempt at preventing the much-dreaded release of the US 
government’s cache of over 250,000 confidential documents. This action ultimately 
forced Wikileaks, founded by Julian Assange, to move onto other servers. Later that 
month, in a show of solidarity with Wikileaks, the collective Anonymous, coordinated 
via the platform 4Chan.org (founded in 2003), would attempt to block the pages 
of companies that subsequently refused to provide services to Wikileaks, such as 
Visa, MasterCard, and PayPal, among others, in an action that came to be known as 
Operation Payback. This strategy of causing denial-of-service failure, first proposed 
by Leonard Kleinrock in 1994, has often been used in many of the best-known 
“artivist” projects, such as in the well-known Toy War campaign (1999), launched 
by the Etoy collective against the company Etoys.com. More recently, this technique 
was employed in the action 4’33 (January 2011) by the Colombian artist Jocelyn 
Bernal. In this project, she managed to block the websites of a number of Spanish 
and Latin American artistic institutions (almost all of them museums), for just over 
four minutes. There was a clear allusion, on the one hand, to the four minutes and 
thirty-three seconds of silence in John Cage’s 1952 piece of the same name, and, on 
the other hand, to the scarce interest shown by these artistic institutions in supporting 
an artform as radically opposed to the logics of the art market (to which, according 
to Bernal, the museum institutions are still subject) as is net art.
3. The “anti-system” possibilities of the “network-system”
The sheer breadth of social potential and political action offered by the rise in digital 
connectivity is something to be celebrated. Social networks have played a decisive 
role in the political struggle for new, effective forms of organisation and large-scale 
mobilisation. These networks have also been crucial in the resistance efforts against 
forms of governmental censorship, demonstrating thus their remarkable capacity 
for boosting, instantly, the dissemination of news and events, and for gaining 
unprecedented access to particular causes. This became especially evident, for 
example, in the acts of protest amid the Iranian electoral process of 2009 (to such an 
extent that the media and press agencies went as far as baptising this phenomenon 
the “Twitter Revolution”), and in the North African revolutions of 2011.
Nevertheless, we must not forget that these “anti-system” possibilities are 
managed, paradoxically, from within the structure of late capitalism itself, 
represented by a handful of American companies (Facebook, Twitter, etc.). This 
leads to a situation, ever paradoxical, in which the users’ statements may well be of 
submission or protest, but they still form part of the exact same “machine”, i.e. the 
machine of informational capitalism. The paradox is evident: if, today, somebody 
were to launch a campaign against Twitter or Facebook, they would have to circulate 
it via Twitter or Facebook. This power, or rather the way that these systems absorb 
even that which opposes the system itself, is fundamental to what we could call 
Martín Prada, J. Escritura e Imagen 16, 2020: 271-284276
the “network-system”. There are, then, certain paradoxes that must be taken into 
account when evaluating the true “anti-system” potential of this “network-system”. 
Corporations such as Twitter and Facebook have reaped vast economic benefits 
while serving as catalysts for all kinds of popular revolutions, all over the world and 
yet, the informational capitalism they represent and advocate, however, has almost 
always been left unquestioned. 
The context in which these massive new critical movements arise today is, 
of course, very different to the early days of the Internet, as mentioned above. In 
the 1990s, online political resistance invariably meant programmed actions (such 
as virtual sit-ins), promoted by activists with extensive technical knowledge and 
who, on occasion, would emphasise certain similarities between their own work and 
the practices of “performance art”. In fact, it can even be claimed that the close 
connection between contemporary art and online digital activism, in the 1990s, was 
precisely because of the highly professional nature of these initial actions, and, above 
all, because many of them were promoted and made public in international artistic 
contexts, such as festivals, electronic art meetings, etc. 
4. The critical manifestation of the connected multitude
In the current second phase of the Internet, which revolves around social media, 
anyone can use social networks and shared platforms to propose an action in which 
tens or even hundreds of thousands of people can participate. A common feature of 
the protests instigated on social media is the out-and-out creativity and humour on 
display, making use of inventive slogans and images to get their point across.
Of particular importance in this regard is the emergence, from within the context 
of social networks, of new and potent visual typologies, such as the meme. Memes 
can be defined as a form of visual expression, not far removed from the situationist 
détournement, and as such they are loaded with the potential for political critique 
and even culture jamming. As a result, there are countless ongoing debates about the 
political power of memes10. Given that they are easy to read and simple to interpret, 
using memes became an informal way of reacting to current events, uniquely 
revealing of the connected multitude’s hunger for satire and humorous criticism. 
Therefore, memes soon found their sweet spot in the social and political debate, 
as seen, for example, in movements such as 15-M in Spain or Occupy Wall Street, 
when certain memes served as vital catalysts in the propagation of ideas11. There are 
many examples of how memetic processes can become active forms of manifesting 
subversion or complicity. However, the hyperhumoristic and ironic discourse of 
memes can also conceal their true political intentionality. This phenomenon has been 
referred to as “Poe’s law”, which asserts how difficult it can be, on the Internet, to 
distinguish between declarations of political extremism and parodies thereof12. 
10 See Lovink, G., «Overcoming Internet Disillusionment: On the Principles of Meme Design», e-flux Journal, 
83 (June, 2017). [https://www.e-flux.com/journal/83/141287/overcoming-internet-disillusionment-on-the-
principles-of-meme-design/].
11 See Milner, R. M., «Pop polyvocality: Internet memes, public participation, and the Occupy Wall Street 
movement», International Journal of Communication, 7 (2013), pp. 2357-2390. [http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/
article/view/1949]. 
12 See Milner, R. M., «Hacking the Social: Internet Memes, Identity Antagonism, and the Logic of Lulz», The 
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It must also be noted that many of the practices of online collective activism, 
which arise more or less spontaneously, still consider their ultimate goal to be the 
gathering of people in a certain place. This is, in essence, another example of the 
call for streets and squares to be reclaimed as media in their own right, and thus 
reactivated as key spaces for social interaction and political protest. Many of the 
flash mobs that have taken place in recent years have, in fact, had serious critical 
intent, with notable social and political engagement. This was true, for example, 
of the ones organised by Collective 8552 in Athens, in June 2011, to denounce the 
measures taken by the Greek government in dealing with the economic crisis, or 
those realised on the outskirts of the Puerta del Sol in Madrid in 2012. Proposals 
like these ones hark back to some of the slogans of the situationists in the 1960s, 
insomuch they tended to favour organised moments of shared life over object-
based art. Flash mobs, and similar strategies, can therefore be seen as processes of 
collaborative activism, as well as the organisation of collective and festive situations 
and environments in the city’s public space. A direct link can thus be made with 
some of the more politically engaged conceptualism of recent decades, or with their 
epigones in “contextual art”13. 
It is completely understandable that many are keen to see, in this gathering of 
the crowd, in this exercise in collective dissent from a peaceful and deeply creative 
standpoint, a certain form of social re-appropriation of the very concept of “artistic 
practice”, or an attempt, at least, at its “realisation” in life. 
It is easy to see, in social phenomena like this, in the materialisation of their 
own teleology of the common, as encouraged by the potential illuminators of the 
“general intellect” (and which could only be understood in political terms as a force 
of solidarity, of exchange and cooperation, as an active being-with-others) many of 
the pragmatic ideals of the most clearly committed art of the 20th century. What is 
certainly evident is that some of these mass movements, self-organised via social 
networks, are attempts at establishing new fields of freedom, of experiences in which 
reflection and expression can be shared, something that largely coincides with the 
most fundamental functions of many of the new artistic practices. It is certainly 
very tempting to draw a link between, on the one hand, those practices in which a 
multitude that begins to redefine itself as a new political and community-minded 
subject, fighting for both a more just society and a radical shift in the forms of 
organisation of life and the rules thus far imposed by the political system’s forms of 
representation of, and, on the other hand, those words of Negri in his text Art and 
Multitude, where love was considered collective poiesis, and art was defined as a 
multitude of singularities in movement. 
5. Hacktivism and artistic practices 
In the 1970s, it was already evident that there was a progressive overlapping of 
the content industry and the media industry, as well as the worldwide media’s 
Fiberculture Journal, 22 (2013), pp. 62-92. [http://twentytwo.fibreculturejournal.org/fcj-156-hacking-the-
social-internet-memes-identity-antagonism-and-the-logic-of-lulz/]. 
13 See Ardenne, P. Un art contextuel, Paris, Flammarion, 2002.
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corresponding drift towards a more commercial “infotainment”14. This was closely 
linked, on the other hand, to the fact that the concept of “freedom” has invariably 
implied, within the logics of late capitalism, a greater freedom of trade, as opposed 
to greater freedom of expression, the latter always losing out to the former, albeit in 
subtle ways. This would explain why, at least in part, practices of online activism 
have focused so much on liberating the act of communication from those economic 
and commercial entities that parasitise it, as well as to creating new communication 
channels and platforms to counteract the hegemonic visions, ever biased and 
opportunist, of the traditional media. 
Over the course of the nineties, the aim of creating a free voice, one that would 
be both critical and politically engaged, and that would make a genuine impact, was 
the driving force of many forms of online political activism. With demonstrated 
effectiveness, as could be seen in its early stages (especially during the support 
for numerous pro-Zapatista activists in 1997), these were practices aimed at 
strengthening the Internet’s ability to correct and compensate for the serious dearth 
of information that was so commonplace in the traditional mass media. These 
initiatives were critical of the mainstream media’s characteristic withholding and 
manipulation of information, so activists sought to create online spaces for social 
and political denunciation without any restrictions or censorship, via mailing lists 
and forums, encouraging thus a kind of critical thinking that, realistically, could 
not have been disseminated in any other way. These methods of critical action were 
barely organised in terms of their tactics, and as such they were nothing like the 
transnational strategies of the large corporations or the internationalism of the NGOs. 
Instead, they sought the transmission and reproduction of their operations on the 
Internet, similar to how a virus works: a broad dissemination, always spontaneous, 
and hardly ever seeking to establish a predetermined structure of operation nor a 
given identity as decreed and regulated by a specific representative body.
One of the most serious problems with the exercising of media freedom is the 
power that governments and corporations wield over Internet communications. The 
permanent and global control of Internet traffic, by means of powerful systems for 
digital surveillance, are now joined by many other forms of restriction and strong 
censorship (as materialised in the monitoring of search engines or other given 
content, among many other expressions of digital censorship), in numerous countries 
around the world. 
Restrictions on web browsing have been thematised in many artistic projects, 
such as China Channel (2008) by Aram Bartholl, Evan Roth and Tobias Leingruber, 
which consisted of an add-on (an installable extension) for the browser Firefox, so 
that any user could surf the Internet with the same restrictions as if they were doing 
so from within the borders of China at that time.
The fight against restrictions on the supply of and access to online information 
already has a history of significant events. Of all the initiatives that have emerged, 
the most notable is “hacktivism” (portmanteau of the words “hacker” and 
“activism”), a strategy which came to the fore in 1998 thanks to some members of 
the Cult of the Dead cow (cDc). Oxblood Ruffin, who is credited with coining this 
term, even made a distinction between hacktivism and simple [h]activism. If the 
14 Portmanteau of the terms “information” and “entertainment”. See Lovink, G., «Radical Media Pragmatism 
Strategies for Tecno-Social Movements», in Infowar (Ars Electronica Catalog 98), Vienna / New York, 1998.
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latter was about making the Internet a space for the dissemination and exchange of 
information in order to organise protest actions, hacktivism would instead favour 
more transgressive interventions related to the Internet’s access restrictions and 
control mechanisms. Dissemination, direct action and creative solutions are some 
of its main characteristics. Its central objective would be none other than to promote 
the right of freedom of opinion and expression, as set forth in article 19 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Proponents of hacktivism considered it to 
be “the use of technology to advance human rights through electronic media”15. It 
is not surprising that this set of practices and interventions has found widespread 
acceptance and support, even from some highly influential institutions of financial 
and industrial capitalism, at the international level.
Generally speaking, the most prevalent and controversial instances of hacking have 
been carried out without any political agenda: these hackers are generally motivated 
by profit, or, sometimes, by the purely personal challenge of breaking secret codes 
and protected data structures, i.e. some form of “cracking” (a term that usually refers 
to activities that corrupt digital data or steal information). Nevertheless, expressly 
politicised hacktivism, though less frequent, did become increasingly important in 
the second half of the nineties.
These socially and politically engaged hackers would formulate what is often 
called cyber-activism, using tactics and methodologies that would come under the 
banner of “ethical hacking”. However, the efforts made by information agencies and 
government organisations to protect their networks and data, during the first decade 
of the 21st century, had the effect of drastically reducing the number and reach of 
actions that we might call “hacktivism”. In fact, that decade’s most significant data 
breach events, such as the release of 250,000 documents from the U.S. Department 
of State, by Wikileaks (and published by five international newspapers in December 
2010), were not the result of hacking into the security mechanisms of the networks 
and computer systems that housed those files – they were, instead, straightforward 
leaks by people who already had access to the confidential information in question. All 
of this suggests that hacktivist practices are in fact more concerned with supporting 
this kind of already-infiltrated action, rather than releasing secret data and files per 
se. Many programmers and activist groups demonstrated their support for Wikileaks 
by blocking the websites of some of the companies or government agencies that had 
participated, directly or otherwise, in the efforts to stop the release of confidential 
information, as initiated by Julian Assange’s organisation. As such, these would be 
the most paradigmatic examples of hacktivism developed in the early 21st century. As 
a practice in its own right, hacktivism was always intended to enhance or supplement 
the existing organisational efforts in the field of activism and political criticism. 
It has tried to foster the potential for action from absolutely anywhere, without 
geographical limitations, and it has managed to evade many systems of control and 
repression. Furthermore, it often receives widespread coverage in the media, which 
gives it a huge advantage over other types of protest.
Hacktivism, with its propensity for symbolic action, is of course closely related to 
the field of art, and many of its interventions and proposals have been included within 
the wide range of practices that make up the history of net art. In fact, hacktivism, let’s 
15 cDc (Cult of the Dead cow), «The Hacktivismo FAQ v1.0», (2001) [http://www.cultdeadcow.com/cDc_files/
HacktivismoFAQ.html].
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not forget, was defined in 1999 as a convergence of activism, art and computerised 
communication. Therefore, for the defenders of hacktivist-led incursions, there is 
hardly any possible distinction between “net art” and “net-activism”. 
To consider hacktivism as an artistic activity in its own right would presuppose 
the rejection of any division or separation between the realm of the imaginary and 
the “real” in the field of the media, or between the political references contained 
within the artistic proposal and its true political effectiveness. Therefore, the concept 
of “art” in this context of interventions is identifiable not so much by what these 
actions provide in terms of language or expression, but rather by the language that 
liberates or helps to liberate. Thus, a certain transposition would take place between 
the traditional idea of art as an expression of what is “repressed” within the individual, 
towards a different conceptualisation of the idea that art is the expression of what is 
“repressed” within the wider social sphere.
Regardless of whether these hacktivist actions have been conceived and/or 
presented as “artistic works”, or exclusively as acts of political protest, the most 
relevant point is that today’s cultural criticism (as exercised both inside and outside 
the media and/or the sphere of the “artistic”) may find a possible role model in 
the activity of hacktivism. It is about assessing their ability to rewrite codes and 
reprogram systems, to open them up or make them collaborate in the flowing of 
information and communication, because, far from being mere tools or instruments 
for work or production, they are, in essence, also cultural codes and social programs. 
The act of opening up what is encrypted, or releasing what has been kept under 
wraps for political reasons, guarded by governments or corporations, is also an 
attempt at discovering what really lies beneath our society’s own tendency to expose 
and reveal, to put everything on display.
It is also worth remembering that, in recent digital “artivism”, the act of expressing 
or revealing that which had previously been covered up has often sought to emulate the 
methods used by corporations or institutions, all in the name of an unlimited freedom 
of information. The immediate precursors of this trend would be those projects that 
played around with the names or branding conventions of certain companies, as well 
as those web campaigns presented as pseudo-businesses and which have often been 
considered as a sub-genre within early Internet art. These initiatives, by appropriating 
the appearances, forms or dynamics of a given commercial endeavour, made use 
of the mechanisms and objectives that so characterise the system in question. 
Furthermore, they highlighted the general powerlessness of those at the other end of 
the spectrum, i.e. those who do not act – unlike these corporations – from a position 
of dominance. 
Hence, in broad terms, one of the most significant avenues for this kind of online 
activism is that of parasitic actions, based on the concept of what today we might 
call “media tactics”. A good case study here is the collective The Yes Men16 and how 
they developed simulations of the websites of certain entities and companies, such 
as the World Trade Organization, ExxonMobil, Halliburton/KBR, British Petroleum, 
and the presidential campaign of George W. Bush (in collaboration with ®Tmark), 
among others. These simulated sites, with deliberately ambiguous addresses, sought 
to convince visitors that they were in fact on the genuine websites of these entities 
and corporations, and thus sow confusion. On these fake sites, the user would read 
16 The two members that make up this collective use the pseudonyms Andy Bichlbaum and Mike Bonanno.
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texts and see images that revealed covered-up truths and schemes, including alleged 
criminal activities perpetrated by these people, institutions and companies, most of 
which were unknown to the wider public. 
In a similar vein to The Yes Men, the group Les liens invisibles, using the same 
strategies of imitation that they had already tried out in projects such as Fake is a 
Fake (2008)17, created the website Peking 2008, a near-copy of the official website of 
the Beijing Olympic Games of that year. However, when clicking any of the links on 
this fake official page, a single video came up in which Chinese political repression 
was denounced. This strategy focused on the act of counterfeiting, exploring thus 
the critical and subversive powers of simulation and imitation, through the effects 
of the ubiquitous and easily identifiable conventions of globalised news. This kind 
of counterfeiting and confusion therefore gave people a voice, it let them be heard, 
so that they could denounce and hear what is generally buried and hidden within 
institutional discourses. 
Actions like this are a form of parasitism, characterised by the appropriation and 
replication of the very language and commercial/institutional structures that are being 
challenged. This is achieved by ironically inhabiting those structures, making use of 
the same means and linguistic ploys that they use, but with the aim of bringing them 
down. It all consists of creating extensions and added functionalities that distort, 
obstruct or reveal the underlying interests of the given organisation’s operating 
dynamics, and these artivists therefore employ strategies for diversion, distortion 
and misrepresentation, similar to those proposed decades ago by the situationist 
détournement.
6. Social media art and dissent
A significant amount of today’s Internet art (now fundamentally “social media art”) 
still presents itself as a way of thinking critically about the logics and dynamics 
of digital connectivity, based on an association of the technological regime and a 
certain form of discrepancy with it.
It is the same difficulty from which Internet art emerged, and from which it would 
justify itself as more than a fleeting practice, proving that its time is none other than 
the endless time of non-conformity and dissension. It is a materialisation, therefore, 
of a social thought, in the form of an artistic intervention in the networked space, 
where the main practices of production and globalised living take place today. The 
critique would be principally aimed at many of the strategies for the production of 
meaning and value that operate on the Internet, at its policies, its forms of business, 
its built-in contradictions that, even so, are reconciled, somewhat vaguely, by means 
of their continued operation.
The main capacity for critical action of these artistic manifestations, those that 
use social media as their field of operation, does not come from research into the 
meanings projected by the network, but rather on the study of the very conditions 
that allow for its construction. Hence, the best Internet art today can be defined, 
precisely, as a poetic analysis of the process of understanding those conditions.
17 Collective comprised of Clemente Pestelli and Gionatan Quintini.
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In the current phase of the connected society, in which terms such as participation, 
contribution, cooperation and social network are omnipresent, discovering what is 
authentically “social”, what is truly emancipatory in all of this, is a challenge that 
should be prioritised.
But it does not seem possible to clarify anything, in this regard, without first 
acknowledging the implementation of a great many strategies adopted by the power 
of the large corporations in recent years. These strategies would be fundamentally 
linked to the fact that economic relations have become increasingly autonomous 
regarding the control exerted by government and state policies. Today, the new 
form of sovereignty produced and disseminated through the networks is global, 
transnational; there are no borders to hold it back, it does not come from from one 
single territorial point, it is decentralised, deterritorialised. Nor is there anything that 
transcends these forces of global interaction, whose model is both oligopolistic and 
democratic. There is no doubt, however, that such globalisation has arrived hand-in-
hand with a process of economic polarisation, in an increasingly impoverished and 
violent world.
With this process, whereby individuals are involved and included in the systems 
of economic production and subjectivity that are characteristic of the network system, 
today’s new forms of power try to manage every single aspect of life, ensuring an all-
encompassing action of its exertion. As such, power is merged with life, it becomes 
abstract, it is no longer exerted upon individuals, but rather, as Foucault already 
diagnosed, it circulates through them (all of us, consciously or otherwise, make it 
circulate). 
Today, the most effective devices for exerting power are based on participatory 
logic, on the fluxes of social activity. And the most effective strategy for biopolitical 
control is an apparently paradoxical action: we are all subjected to the same forces, 
but in different ways. The big Internet corporations are clear about one thing: the 
connected crowd cannot be regimented; normalisation can no longer be effective. 
Therefore, as opposed to the attempts at homogenising procedures, at treating 
everybody in the same way, the economic logic of the network-system is based on 
differentiating and singling out all procedures, or on allowing everybody to single 
them out in their own way, resulting in a copious supply of free choice, of free 
decision-making. The system seeks to correspond to the multiplicity of singularities 
that make up the connected multitude, and suppress them, by means of their unwitting 
self-conversion into transmitters of the new forms of power. Dominance is no longer 
a unilateral relationship, but rather it operates through shifting, unstable power 
games, based on seductive and diffuse strategies for the circulation and transmission 
of communicative and affective pleasures. 
So the most politically engaged social media art cannot be rightly understood 
as just something that is accessed via the Internet, or presented on the Internet, or 
mere online content – instead, it is something that actually seeks to encompass the 
Internet, which studies, indicates and presents it. Its key strategy would be, in this 
sense, one of “invagination”: to flip an established situation, to contain the network 
space instead of being contained by it, to appropriate that space instead of just being 
presented inside it18.
 It is not just about creating a “spectacle” or a work that thematises the social 
18 See Martín Prada, J., «Hacia una teoría del social meda art», in Revista de Occidente, 465, (2020), pp. 5-25
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conditions of what is happening and what is controlled in the field of the network, 
but rather it is about presenting the network as a “spectacle” in itself, seeking to 
intervene in the real articulation of their systems of production and the circulation of 
meanings and their processes, revealing how the new forms of power take hold there.
Moreover, the ideal critical function of works of Internet art would not be so 
much the critical experiencing of a new medium but, rather, to experience ourselves 
in it. This would point to a critical awareness of the medium itself and, as such, its 
true political potentialities would be situated.
It is a process of turning the medium itself into the central working theme, by 
helping us momentarily break the ties that bind us to it, making us think poetically 
about something that is much more than a means of transmission, through, precisely, 
establishing it as an activity.
It is true that, in defining the social and communicative evolution of the Internet 
through the principles brought about by the Web 2.0 model (social networking, 
sharing, dialogue, commentary, peer networks etc.), the ideological neutrality of 
its technologies is always assumed to be a fundamental value of life in the most 
technologically developed societies. Perhaps this is why it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to distinguish between validity or scope of meaning and mere economics. 
This would support the view that, from within the field of artistic production, the 
ultimate purpose of current social media art should in fact be to reveal this distinction.
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